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During the course of an epidemic, individuals constantly make decisions on how to fight
against epidemic spreading1–5. Collectively, these individual decisions are critical to the
global outcome of the epidemic, especially when no pharmaceutical interventions are available6–8.
However, existing epidemic models lack the ability to capture this complex decision-making
process, which is shaped by an interplay of factors including government-mandated pol-
icy interventions, expected socio-economic costs, perceived infection risks and social influ-
ences. Here, we introduce a novel parsimonious model, grounded in evolutionary game the-
ory, able to capture decision-making dynamics over heterogeneous time scales9. Using real
data, we analyse three case studies in the spreading of gonorrhoea, the 1918–19 Spanish
flu and COVID-19. Behavioural factors shaping the course of the epidemic are intelligi-
bly mapped onto a minimal set of model parameters, and their interplay gives rise to char-
acteristic phenomena, such as sustained periodic outbreaks, multiple epidemic waves, or a
∗These authors contributed equally.
†These authors contributed equally.
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successful eradication of the disease. Our model enables a direct assessment of the epidemi-
ological and socio-economic impact of different policy interventions implemented to combat
epidemic outbreaks. Besides the common-sense finding that stringent non-pharmaceutical
interventions are essential to taming the initial phases of the outbreak, the duration of such
interventions and the way they are phased out are key for an eradication in the medium-to-
long term. Surprisingly, our findings reveal that social influence is a double-edged sword in
the control of epidemics, helping strengthen collective adoption of self-protective behaviours
during the early stages of the epidemic, but then accelerating their rejection upon lifting of
non-pharmaceutical containment interventions.
1 Introduction
In the absence of pharmaceutical interventions, slowing or eradicating an epidemic in a population
crucially depends on the actions of a sufficiently large number of individuals to adopt appropriate
behavioural responses such as physical distancing or wearing face masks. However, such human
behaviours are typically not considered in classical mathematical epidemic models10, including
those for the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic11–13. To bridge this gap, recent efforts have led to indi-
vidual behavioural responses being incorporated into mathematical epidemic models1–4. However,
even these recent works suffer from a simplistic focus on the concept of individual awareness:
while it is true that the awareness of an outbreak drives individuals to adopt self-protective be-
haviours to reduce the probability of becoming infected14, 15, recent lessons on the complexity of
human behaviours from the COVID-19 outbreak have exposed inherent limitations of awareness-
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based modelling mechanisms5. In particular, such mechanisms are often purely instantaneous and
reactive, thus failing to capture the very factors that affect time-varying behavioural responses over
the whole duration of an epidemic, such as social influence and perceived socio-economic costs.
An additional salient aspect highlighted by COVID-19 is the impact of government-mandated
policy interventions on individuals’ decision-making processes7, 8, 16. Finally, high levels of uncer-
tainty cause bounded rationality to become prominent in an individual’s decision making, which is
seldom included in current behavioural-epidemic models17.
Here, we move the focus from the instantaneous impact of reactive and fully rational be-
havioural responses at the onset of an epidemic (as in awareness-based models) to a long-term
outlook where complex behavioural dynamics arise for each individual. To this end, our model is
based on an evolutionary game approach that is able to capture bounded rational decision-making
processes that evolve over the long term9. Our approach enables the explicit inclusion of the
most salient factors that each individual balances and trades off when deciding their behavioural
response to an epidemic outbreak, such as social influence, perceived infection risks, policy inter-
ventions by authorities and the accumulation of socio-economic costs18. This allows for a better
assessment of the effectiveness of different policy interventions from a healthcare point of view,
while also evaluating their socio-economic impacts 19, 20.
We demonstrate our paradigm by incorporating it into two exemplary epidemic progression
models and applying them to three real-world case studies, including an instance of periodic out-
breaks of gonorrhoea and the 1918 Spanish flu pandemic, for which it consistently reproduces the
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historical occurrence of consecutive waves of infections. We also shed light on several “what-
if” scenarios of relevance to the current COVID-19 outbreak, covering the whole course of the
epidemic evolution. Notably, we show that in the early stages, weak interventions can lead to
a general failure to adopt self-protective behaviours, resulting in multiple overlapping infection
waves. On the other hand, we demonstrate that in the advanced phases of the epidemic evolu-
tion, the time over which a phased reduction of a lockdown occurs, rather than the severity of
the initial lockdown itself, determines whether a second infectious wave appears, yielding severe
health and socio-economic consequences. Importantly, we identify that social influence acts as a
double-edged sword, providing benefits during the early stages of a lockdown, but accelerating the
collective rejection of self-protective behaviours during its phased reduction.
2 Model
We consider a population V = {1, . . . , n} of n individuals. Each individual i ∈ V is charac-
terised by a two-dimensional variable (xi(t), yi(t)), which models their health state and the social
behaviour adopted at the discrete time t ∈ Z≥0, respectively.
The variable xi(t) ∈ A takes values in a discrete set of health states A. For the sake of
simplicity, we start by introducing our paradigm in combination with the well-known susceptible–
infected–susceptible (SIS) epidemic model21, which is characterised by two health states: S repre-
sents susceptible individuals, who are healthy and can be infected by the disease upon interacting
with infected individuals, represented by the state I . A global observable z(t) measures the de-
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Figure 1: Illustration of the network model and the epidemic progression. In (a), two time-steps
in the two-layer network representation. The upper layer (green) shows influences, the lower layer
(violet) contacts. In (b), schematics of the state transitions of the SIS model (above) and of the
SEIR model (below). The constants λ, µ and ν indicate transition probabilities.
tectable prevalence of the epidemic disease at time t: z(t) = 1
n
|{i : xi(t) = I}|, where | · | denotes
a set’s cardinality. Further health states may be added to the set A to capture specific features of
the disease being studied21.
The social behaviour of individual i is captured by the binary variable yi(t) ∈ {0, 1} that
expresses whether the individual adopts self-protective behaviours (yi(t) = 1) or continues as
normal (yi(t) = 0). The paradigm is amenable to extensions to capture different levels of self-
protection through modification of the support set of yi(t).
The spread of the disease and the individuals’ decision-making processes co-evolve, mutu-
ally influencing one another on a two-layered network structure G = (V , EI , EC(t)), illustrated in
Fig. 1a. The set of undirected links EI defines the static influence layer, capturing social influence
between individuals during the decision-making process. The contact layer is defined through a
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time-varying set of undirected links EC(t), which represent the physical contacts between pairs of
individuals that may result in the transmission of the disease. We model the contact layer using
an activity-driven network (ADN)22, which captures important features of complexity that charac-
terise real-world networks. In ADNs, a constant parameter ai ∈ [0, 1], called activity, expresses
individual i’s propensity to generate m ≥ 1 interactions with other individuals at each discrete
time instant. Details are provided in the Methods.
Epidemic Spread At each discrete time-step t, every individual i that is susceptible and does not
adopt self-protections (i.e. xi(t) = S and yi(t) = 0) may become infected. A constant parameter
λ ∈ [0, 1], termed infection probability, captures the probability that the disease is transmitted by
an infectious individual (xj(t) = I) to a susceptible one through physical contact. We assume that
an individual adopting self-protection, yi(t) = 1, is always successful in preventing contagion.
Beside the contagion, at each time-step t, every infected individual i recovers with probability
µ ∈ (0, 1], becoming susceptible again to the disease. These transitions are illustrated in Fig. 1b,
while technical details are provided in the Methods.
Human Behaviour Concurrently with the epidemic evolution, at each time-step t, each individual
enacts a decision-making process on the adoption of self-protective behaviours, according to an
evolutionary game-based mechanism termed logit learning9. The resulting behaviour is updated
in a probabilistic fashion. We define two payoff functions pii(0) and pii(1), which represent a
combination of socio-psychological, economic and personal benefits received by individual i for
enacting behaviours yi = 0 and yi = 1, respectively. This individual then adopts self-protective
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behaviours with a probability equal to
P[yi(t+ 1) = 1] =
exp{βpii(1)}
exp{βpii(0)}+ exp{βpii(1)} . (1)
The parameter β ∈ [0,∞) measures an individual’s rationality in the decision-making process;
the larger the parameter β, the higher the probability that the individual chooses the behaviour that
maximises their payoff. Payoffs are defined as
pii(0) :=
1
di
∑
j:(i,j)∈EI
(1− yj(t))− u(t), (2a)
pii(1) :=
1
di
∑
j:(i,j)∈EI
yj(t) + r(z(t))− fi(t), (2b)
and contain the following four terms, directly related to behavioural and social factors that shape
the epidemic dynamics (more details can be found in the Methods).
• Social influence. The first summation terms in Eqs. (2a) and (2b) are inherited from co-
ordination games on networks23. These terms capture the social influence of neighbouring
individuals and the individual’s desire to coordinate with them, as it provides an increased
payoff for adopting the same behaviour as that adopted by the majority of the neighbours.
• Policy interventions. The time-varying term u(t) ≥ 0 in Eq. (2a) captures a broad range
of non-pharmaceutical interventions enforced by public authorities to discourage dangerous
behaviours, e.g. by means of a fine or imprisonment or by providing benefits for working
from home.
• Risk perception. The risk-perception function r(z) : [0, 1]→ R≥0 in Eq. (2b) is a monoton-
ically non-decreasing function of the detectable prevalence z, which captures an incentive to
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adopt self-protective behaviour due to the endogenous fear of becoming infected as the dis-
ease spreads. Individuals may learn of z from the media coverage of the epidemic evolution.
For simplicity, here we assume that all individuals share the same risk-perception function.
• Cost of self-protective behaviour. The negative impact of adopting self-protective be-
haviours is captured in Eq. (2b) by the frustration function
fi(t) = c+
t∑
s=1
γscyi(t− s), (3)
where c ≥ 0 is the social, psychological and economic immediate cost per unit-time associ-
ated with the adoption of self-protective behaviours, e.g. related to the inability to socialise,
work from the office, enjoy public spaces, etc., and γ ∈ [0, 1] is its accumulation factor19.
Thus, fi(t) ≥ 0 reflects accumulative costs for individual i up to time t.
Impact of an Epidemic Outbreak A major strength of the proposed paradigm lies in its ability to
facilitate a thorough evaluation of the immediate health and socio-economic impact of an epidemic
outbreak due to the population’s behavioural responses to prescribed policy interventions, a task
that has been considered extremely challenging so far18, 20. In fact, our formalism enables the
direct computation of the health cost, which is directly related to the health state of individuals (i.e.
xi(t)), and the socio-economic cost, which depends on the behaviours adopted by the population
(i.e. yi(t)). By evaluating these costs for all individuals in the population, a cumulative health
cost H (for example, the percentage of the population infected) and socio-economic cost C for the
epidemic as a whole can be determined. More details and the explicit expression of these quantities
used in the discussion of the case studies below can be found in the Methods.
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3 Results
Onset of the Epidemic For large populations and fully connected influence layers, we use a mean-
field approach24 to obtain insight into the behaviour of the system at the initial stages of the epi-
demic through the computation of the epidemic threshold. In the absence of cumulative frustration
(which is a reasonable assumption in the early stages of an outbreak) and assuming a constant
intervention u(t) = u¯, the outbreak is quickly eradicated if
λ
µ
<
eβ(1−u¯) + (1− β)e−βc
m(〈a〉+√〈a2〉)(eβ(1−u¯) − βe−βc) , (4)
where 〈a〉 and 〈a2〉 are the average and second moment of the activity distribution, respectively (the
derivation of Eq. (4) can be found in the Methods). Figure 2 shows that mild non-pharmaceutical
interventions (small u¯) have only a minor impact on the epidemic threshold, since they may not
provide a sufficient incentive to abandon the status-quo non-protective behaviours. On the other
hand, the epidemic threshold increases significantly if u¯ is sufficiently large. The socio-economic
cost c also plays an important role, whereby small increases can lower the threshold even for large
u¯. This implies that the perception of a high socio-economic cost may hamper the outcome of
strong non-pharmaceutical interventions.
The threshold in Eq. (4) offers insight into the role of human behaviour in the early stages
of an epidemic outbreak. We now move to the medium/long-term horizon, and consider scenarios
in which the threshold is exceeded, yielding a large initial outbreak across the population. To shed
light on the potential of our method, we present three case studies based on real data, viz. gonor-
rhoea, Spanish flu and COVID-19. To model the spread of gonorrhoea we use the basic SIS model
9
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Figure 2: Ratio between the epidemic threshold computed in Eq. (4) and the corresponding quan-
tity without self-protective behaviours22 as a function of the cost of adopting self-protective be-
haviours c and of policy interventions u¯ (β = 2). The larger this ratio (i.e. in the blue region), the
more resistant the system is to the epidemic outbreak.
described earlier; to capture the latency period after contagion and immunity after recovery or
death relevant to Spanish flu and COVID-19, we adopt a susceptible–exposed–infectious–removed
(SEIR) model21, as described in the Methods and illustrated in Fig. 1b. Parameters are also detailed
in the Methods.
SIS Modelling of Gonorrhoea Spreading Despite its simplicity, the SIS model has found an
important application in the study of gonorrhoea outbreaks25. We focus on revealing the role of
the risk perception function r(z) in shaping the epidemic outbreak and the behavioural response.
Hence, we fix all other parameters and assume that no policy interventions are implemented. In
Fig. 3, we consider three scenarios with progressively less cautious populations, showing that this
shift in risk perception changes not only the quantitative, but also the qualitative, characteristic
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Figure 3: Prevalence of gonorrhoea infections (red curve) as a function of time as predicted by
an SIS model using our co-evolution paradigm. The colour intensity of the blue vertical bands
indicates the level of adoption of self-protective behaviours, i.e. 1
n
∑n
i=1 yi. In (a), a responsive
population (r(z) = 3
√
z) results in quick adoption of self-protective behaviours and fast eradica-
tion of the disease, after the first wave. In (b), multiple waves emerge in a less cautious population
(r(z) = 3z), yielding periodic waves of reinfection. In (c), in a population that underestimates the
risk (r(z) = 3z2), the disease becomes endemic and a meta-stable equilibrium emerges. Parame-
ters are defined in the Methods.
phenomena observed. This demonstrates the power of our model, which allows to capture and
reproduce a range of real-world phenomena within a unified modelling framework. In fact, by
tuning just one parameter in the decision-making mechanism, we shift from fast eradication of the
disease (Fig. 3a), to periodic oscillations both in the epidemic prevalence and in the behavioural
response (Fig. 3b), and to the emergence of a meta-stable endemic equilibrium with a pervasive
and long-term diffusion of the disease (Fig. 3c).
Notice that, as further detailed in the Methods, the risk perception function determines a
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critical prevalence which guarantees a pervasive adoption of self-protections regardless of the be-
haviour of others. In our first scenario, this critical prevalence is z∗ ≈ 18%. However, as can be
observed in Fig. 3a, social influence causes individuals to rapidly and widely adopt self-protective
behaviours much earlier, when the prevalence is z(t) ≈ 6%, highlighting the key role played by
social influence in shaping collective behavioural patterns and, in this instance, helping in the fast
eradication of the disease.
SEIR Modelling of the Spanish Flu Pandemic We use an SEIR model combined with our
paradigm to reproduce the 1918–19 Spanish flu pandemic (see Methods). Using only model pa-
rameters rooted in the actual historical context, the simulation results in Figure 4 are qualitatively
consistent with the epidemiological data that witnessed a resurgent pandemic with three waves
including a massive second one6, 26. More importantly, key contributing factors identified from our
model predictions as leading to the resurgence of new and even larger outbreaks also reflect his-
torical observations. In particular, a slowly increasing risk perception — associated with the initial
suppression of news about the flu27 — results in a delay of over a month after the initial outbreak
for the population to adopt self-protective behaviours. Meanwhile, a fast accumulating frustra-
tion (corresponding for example to the emergence of anti-mask movements at the time) results in
self-protective behaviours being abandoned immediately when the epidemic prevalence decreases.
By doubling the duration of the interventions (from 28 days, as reported in the literature6, to
56 days) or by relying on a more responsive population (details in the Methods), only a single wave
is witnessed, consistent with the historical fact that some cities successfully stopped the Spanish
12
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Figure 4: Prevalence of Spanish flu infections (red curve) and cumulative infections (orange
curve) as a function of time as predicted by an SEIR model in combination with the co-evolution
paradigm. The colour intensity of the blue vertical bands represents the fraction of adopters of
self-protective behaviours. Our simulation qualitatively reproduces the 1918–19 pandemic out-
break with three consecutive epidemic waves. The impact of the outbreak is measured by health
cost H = 59.91% and socio-economic cost C = 6.02, as detailed in the Methods.
13
flu through longer, timely interventions28. The health costs in terms of cumulative epidemic preva-
lence is reduced from 59% to 11% and 4%, respectively, while the socio-economic costs associated
with the adoption of self-protective behaviours are reduced by more than 50% (see Methods and
Supplementary Fig. S1). This illustrates the power of our paradigm for predicting future scenar-
ios once a particular parametrisation and model have been secured from empirical data. Existing
approaches typically estimate how infection parameters, associated with the disease dynamics, are
explicitly changed due to policy interventions11. In contrast, our paradigm leaves the disease dy-
namics untouched, and allows policy interventions to influence the decision-making process, thus
determining the behavioural responses, which, in turn, shape the epidemic evolution.
Modelling of the COVID-19 Pandemic Having established that our model reproduces key fea-
tures of past epidemics, we now demonstrate its power as a predictive tool by analysing several
different intervention scenarios for the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic13. To this end, we again inte-
grate our game-theoretical framework into an SEIR model. In each of the simulations, we consider
the same cost and accumulation factor, and a population that is slow to perceive COVID-19 as a
threat; by varying the intervention strategies, and the level of social influence, we reveal the global
impact of these factors.
Firstly, we observe that mild policy interventions, even if indefinite in duration, may not be
sufficient to ensure a timely and collective adoption of self-protective behaviours. For instance, the
population in Fig. 5a is overwhelmed by the epidemic because social influence acts as inertia to
delay the adoption of self-protective behaviours (Supplementary Fig. S2)29. Then, we consider two
14
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Figure 5: Prevalence of COVID-19 infections (red curve) and cumulative infections (orange
curve) as a function of time as predicted by an SEIR model in combination with the co-evolution
paradigm. The colour intensity of the blue vertical bands represents the fraction of adopters of
self-protective behaviours. In (a), a mild policy intervention and accumulating frustration results
in sporadic adoption of self-protection, and thus two massive epidemic waves that overlap and a
long tail (health cost H = 65.29%, socio-economic cost C = 15.55). In (b), a severe policy in-
tervention with a long phased reduction period keeps the epidemic outbreak contained to a single
wave (H = 5.19%, C = 12.24). In (c), a very severe policy intervention with a short phased
reduction period results in two consecutive epidemic waves (H = 9.56%, C = 23.79). In (d), the
policy in (b) is implemented in a scenario without social influence, showing that social influence is
key to guaranteed collective (and thus effective) behavioural responses (H = 49.58%, C = 60.34).
Parameters and costs are detailed in the Methods.
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scenarios with severe but short policy interventions, followed by a linear phased reduction (Figs. 5b
and 5c; in the first scenario, the policy is less severe but the reduction period is longer). Comparing
the two scenarios, we conclude that, provided that the initial policy interventions are sufficiently
severe (to avoid the scenario shown in Fig. 5a), the successful eradication of the disease depends
primarily on the phased reduction period being sufficiently long. The latter point is consistent with
observations from the recent literature on the duration of policy interventions16. In fact, the disease
is quickly eradicated in the first scenario after the first wave, with 5.2% of cumulative infections
and even a decrease in the socio-economic cost compared to the indefinite but mild policy discussed
above, while the second (more severe, but shorter) choice of interventions yields a second wave
with a final prevalence of 9.6% and a socio-economic cost that is almost doubled.
Finally, in Fig. 5d, we repeat the scenario observed in Fig. 5b but remove the factor of social
influence.We find that the presence of social influence during the initial severe intervention period
ensures a collective population response with a 99% adoption rate of self-protective behaviours
(Fig. 5b); in contrast, the adoption rate is reduced to ≈ 60% without social influence (Fig. 5d).
However, during the phased reduction period, social influence accelerates a collective rejection of
self-protective behaviours; in Fig. 5b, individuals overwhelmingly reject self-protective behaviour
completely two weeks before the end of the phased reduction period (Supplementary Fig. S3). This
resembles the difficulties experienced by some countries in controlling the exit out of a lockdown in
the current COVID-19 pandemic30. The crucial role played by social pressures as concluded from
our simulation results and the resonance thereof in the COVID-19 reality indicate the need for
epidemics models to include time-varying behavioural responses. The model predictions highlight
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the challenges policy makers experience in designing interventions, but also provide important
directions. For example, our model results indicate that it is more effective to focus on managing
the duration and relaxation of the interventions, and our findings support the suggestion in5 of a
closer examination of how to exploit social influence to marshal effective long-term responses to
an epidemic. This analysis highlights the potential of our modelling paradigm in helping policy
makers assess control actions to effectively address epidemic outbreaks. Its input parameters are
closely related to observable properties of the epidemic as well as the population; the wealth of
behavioural data currently being gathered in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic will therefore
allow further refining of the model.
4 Conclusion
Inspired by evidence of the key role played by individuals’ behavioural responses in shaping an
epidemic outbreak, we have combined proven models of epidemics with an evolutionary game-
based description of individual decision-making into a novel unified modelling paradigm. To our
knowledge, this is the first time an epidemic model has addressed the complex decision-making
process of a population responding to an epidemic. Different from existing behavioural mod-
els based on reactive responses1–4 and from game theoretical models based on imitation31, 32, our
paradigm models how individual decisions are influenced by a large range of time-varying factors,
including government interventions, risk perceptions, irrationality and social interactions through-
out the duration of an epidemic outbreak, from the outbreak to eradication. When applied to
case studies of the spreading of gonorrhoea, the 1918–19 Spanish flu and COVID-19, the model
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captures a wide range of realistic outcome scenarios and specifically reveals the impact of social
influence and phasing out of government interventions on the persistence of an epidemic. As the
framework is parsimonious and universal, with parameters rooted to the specifics of both popula-
tion and epidemic, it enables well-founded predictions of the effectiveness of non-pharmaceutical
policy interventions in terms of health costs and socio-economic costs.
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Methods
Details of the network structure The two-layered network structure with a static influence layer
and a time-varying physical contact layer is motivated by the observation that social relationships
(e.g. between family members, friends, colleagues) typically change at a much slower pace than
that of epidemic processes and thus can be assumed constant, while the network of physical con-
tacts evolves at a time-scale comparable with the spread of the disease33.
The contact layer is modelled using an activity-driven network (ADN)22. ADNs have emerged
as a powerful paradigm to study the dynamical co-evolution of (i) the network structure, and (ii)
the process unfolding at each node. ADNs have found successful application in mathematical
epidemiology34. The network formation process acts as follows. At each discrete time instant t,
with probability ai, individual i activates and generates a fixed number of contacts m ≥ 1 with
other individuals chosen uniformly at random in the population. These contacts are added to the
link set EC(t), contribute to the epidemic process, and are then removed before the next discrete
time instant and the next activation of individuals. Despite their simplicity, which enables rigorous
analytical treatment and fast numerical simulations22, 35, ADNs can capture important features of
complexity that characterise real-world networks and are amenable to analytically-tractable exten-
sions to include further features. Importantly, the proposed modelling paradigm can also use other
time-varying network models, e.g. temporal switching networks36.
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Details of the SIS model According to the SIS mechanism described in the main paper, the con-
tagion probability for a generic individual i ∈ V is
P[xi(t+ 1) = I|xi(t) = S] = (1− yi(t))
(
1− (1− λ)Ni(t)) , (5)
where
Ni(t) = |{j ∈ V : (i, j) ∈ EC(t), xj(t) = I}| (6)
is the number of infectious individuals that have a link with node i at time t on the contact layer.
While Eq. (5) posits that adoption of self-protective behaviour, viz. yi(t) = 1, always makes
the contagion probability equal to 0, the model can be generalised by introducing a parameter
to reflect that self-protective behaviours have a probability in failing to prevent infection. The
recovery process described in the main paper is governed by the following probabilistic rule:
P[xi(t+ 1) = S |xi(t) = I] = µ . (7)
Details of the SEIR model In the SEIR model, individuals may have four different health states:
they can be susceptible to the disease (S); exposed (E), i.e. already infected but asymptomatic;
infected and symptomatic (I); or removed (R), accounting for both recoveries and deaths. The
disease spreads as follows. At each discrete time-step t, every individual i that is susceptible (i.e.
xi(t) = S) and does not adopt self-protective behaviours (i.e. yi(t) = 0) may become infected.
Similar to the SIS model, we introduce a constant parameter λ ∈ [0, 1], termed infection proba-
bility, which captures the probability that the infectious disease is transmitted from an infectious
individual to a susceptible one through a link in the contact layer. After contagion, individuals be-
comes exposed (E). The disease propagates through contacts, each one independent of the others,
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yielding
P[xi(t+ 1) = E|xi(t) = S] = (1− yi(t))
(
1− (1− λ)Ni(t)) , (8)
where Ni(t) is the number of neighbours of node i on the contact layer that are infectious at time
t. Depending on the specifics of the disease, exposed (i.e. pre-symptomatic) individuals may be
infectious or not, giving
Ni(t) =

|{j ∈ V : (i, j) ∈ EC(t), xj(t) ∈ {E, I}}| if exposed individuals are infectious,
|{j ∈ V : (i, j) ∈ EC(t), xj(t) = I}| otherwise.
(9)
Beside the contagion, two other mechanisms govern the epidemic process: the emergence
of symptoms and the recovery process. Specifically, at each time-step t, every individual i that is
exposed (E) has probability ν ∈ (0, 1] to become symptomatic, independent of the others, giving
P[xi(t+ 1) = I |xi(t) = E] = ν . (10)
Then, infected individuals have probability µ ∈ (0, 1] to recover, independent of the others, giving
P[xi(t+ 1) = R |xi(t) = I] = µ . (11)
Different from the SIS model, once removed, individuals are immunised and cannot be infected
again.
Details of the decision-making mechanism Here, we provide with some additional details and
comments on the decision-making mechanism. The parameter β ∈ [0,∞) and the log-linear learn-
ing dynamics in Eq. (16) model bounded rationality in an individual’s decision-making process.
21
We have assumed for simplicity that β is homogeneous among all individuals in this work, but this
is easily generalisable to be heterogeneous. Notice that if β = 0, individuals make decisions uni-
formly at random, while for β → ∞, individuals apply perfect rationality to select the behaviour
with highest payoff. This best-response behaviour is myopic, i.e. individuals do not look forward
in time to optimise a sequence of decisions.
The risk perception function is a monotonic non-decreasing function of z(t), capturing the
fear of being infected that rises as the number of symptomatic individuals increase. In its simplest
formulation (which will be adopted in the three case studies presented in this paper), it can be
assumed to be a power function
r(z) = kzα, (12)
with k > 0 and α > 0. Specifically, α ∈ (0, 1) models cautious populations, where a small initial
outbreak causes a large increase in the risk perception. The case α = 1 captures a population
whose reaction grows exactly proportionally to the epidemic prevalence observe. On the contrary,
α > 1 captures populations that underestimate the risk, and the epidemic prevalence must be large
before the risk perception plays an important role in the decision-making process. The constant
k is a scaling constant. In the main paper, we consider three different functions as archetypes of
three different scenarios: a cautious population (α < 1/2), a population with reaction proportional
to the epidemic prevalence (α = 1), and a slow reacting population (α = 2). In all three cases we
set k = 3.
Note that, in the absence of the accumulation of socio-economic costs (γ = 0) and without
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policy interventions u(t) = 0, the risk perception function determines a critical prevalence
z∗ = min{z : r(z) > 1 + c}, (13)
such that, z(t) > z∗ implies pii(1) > pii(0), for any individual i. In other words, if the de-
tectable prevalence exceeds z∗, each individual will always favour the adoption of self-protective
behaviours, regardless of the behaviour of other individuals and of the presence of policy interven-
tions.
We remark that the risk perception (as well as the cost of self-protection) is endogenous to
each individual, different from the policy intervention u(t), which is exogenous and from the social
influence, which is determined by the network structure.
Evaluating the socio-economic impact The health cost H is a functional that quantifies the costs
related to the health state of individuals and may have different definitions, depending on the
epidemic model used and on the focus of the study. In our case studies, we define the heath cost
for the SEIR model as the total number of infections, i.e. the cumulative prevalence. Specifically,
fixed a period of observation T ≥ 0 (the duration of the epidemic outbreak), we define
H(T ) =
1
n
|{i : xi(T ) = R}| . (14)
Note that in the SIS model, the health cost may be defined as the average epidemic prevalence over
the period of observation.
We define the per capita socio-economic cost over a fixed period of observation T ≥ 0
(the duration of the epidemic outbreak) as the average cumulative immediate costs incurred by an
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individual in the population, that is,
C :=
1
n
T∑
t=0
n∑
i=1
cyi(t) . (15)
Derivation of the epidemic threshold for the SIS model In the absence of cumulative frustration
and for a fully mixed influence layer, we observe that
P[yi(t+ 1) = 0] =
exp{βpii(0)}
exp{βpii(0)}+ exp{βpii(1)} (16)
has the same expression for all the nodes. In fact, if we define y¯(z) as the probability that a generic
node adopts self-protective behaviours when the epidemic prevalence is equal to z, then, according
to the strong law of large numbers, pii(0) = 1 − y¯(z) − u(t) = 1 − y¯(z) − u¯ (since the control
is assumed to be a constant function) and pii(1) = y¯(z) + r(z) − c, which are independent of i.
In a mean-field approach24, we define θ(t) = 1
n
∑
i:xi(t)=I
ai as the average activity of infected
nodes and zi(t) = P[xi(t) = I]. Due to the strong law of large numbers, in the limit of large-scale
systems n → ∞, z(t) = 1
n
∑n
i=1 zi(t) and θ(t) =
1
n
∑n
i=1 aizi(t). Hence, from the mean-field
evolution of zi(t), given by
zi(t+ 1) = zi(t)− µzi(t) + (1− zi(t))(1− y¯(z(t)))aiz(t) + (1− z(t))(1− y¯(z(t)))λθ(t) , (17)
we determine the following system of difference equations for the epidemic prevalence and the
average activity of infected individuals, linearised about the disease-free equilibrium (z = 0, θ =
0):
z(t+ 1) = z(t)− µz(t) +mλ〈a〉z(t)(1− y¯(0)) +mλ(1− y¯(0))θ(t)
θ(t+ 1) = θ(t)− µθ(t) +mλ〈a2〉z(t)(1− y¯(0)) +mλ〈a〉(1− y¯(0))θ(t) .
(18)
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From standard theory on the stability of discrete-time linear time-invariant systems37, the origin is
stable if
λ
µ
<
1
m(〈a〉+√〈a2〉)(1− y¯(0)) . (19)
In fully-mixed influence layers, the probability for an individual to adopt self-protective be-
haviours y¯(z) can be derived by substituting pii(0) = 1 − y¯(z) − u¯ and pii(1) = y¯(z) + r(z) − c
into Eq. (16), obtaining the equilibrium equation:
y¯ =
eβ(y¯−c+r(z))
eβ(y¯−c+r(z)) + eβ(1−y¯−u¯)
. (20)
Even though it is not possible to derive a closed-form solution, we observe that at the inception
of the epidemic outbreak, yi(0) = 0 for all individuals and, for sufficiently small values of u¯ (i.e.
u¯5.21 + c), in the early stages it is verified that pii(0) > pii(1). Hence, if the rationality β is
sufficiently large, the equilibrium y¯ is close to 0 and can be approximated by Taylor-expanding the
right-hand side of the equation, obtaining
y¯(z) ≈ e
β(−c+r(z))
eβ(1−u¯) + (1− β)eβ(−c+r(z)) . (21)
Network parameters of the simulations In all the simulations, we consider n = 10, 000 indi-
viduals (10 of them initially infected) connected on the influence layer through a Watts–Strogatz
small-world network, which captures many features of real-world influence networks, including a
clustered structure and the presence of long-range interactions38. We set an average degree 8 and
rewiring probability 1/8, so that each node has on average 1 long-range interaction.
The contact layer is generated following an ADN with power-law distributed activities ai
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with exponent 2.09, as in Aiello et al.39, and lower cutoff at amin = 0.1. We set m = 1 interactions
per active node for gonorrhoea and m = 13 for Spanish flu and COVID-19, based on40.
Epidemic parameters of the simulations In the three case studies we use two different classical
epidemic models: the SIS and the SEIR model. The former is used for gonorrhoea, which is a
sexually transmitted disease characterised by negligible protective immunity after recovery and
negligible latency period (individuals are infectious on average the day after contagion)25, 41. An
SEIR model is used to capture latency periods after contagion and immunity after recovery, which
have been observed for the Spanish flu26 and COVID-198. In the two SEIR case studies we rely
on slightly different implementations of the epidemic model. For Spanish flu, based on established
evidence, we assume that exposed (pre-symptomatic) individuals are not infectious26. For the
COVID-19 case study, where the preliminary observations are fewer and there is no consensus on
the infectiousness of asymptomatic individuals, we assume the worst-case scenario in which all
exposed individuals are infectious.
The epidemic parameters are set from epidemiological data. Specifically, reliable estimations
of the time from contagion to symptoms onset τE (for Spanish Flu and COVID-19) and the time
from symptoms onset to recovery τI (for all three diseases) are available8, 25, 26. Similar to8, from
these data we define
ν = 1− exp
(
− 1
τE
)
, and µ = 1− exp
(
− 1
τI
)
. (22)
Finally, the parameter λ is obtained from available estimations of the basic reproduction number
R0 for the three diseases8, 25, 26. The basic reproduction number is defined as the average number
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of secondary infections produced by an infected individual in a population where everyone is
susceptible. Hence, if we define τ to be the average time that an individual is infectious (τ = τI+τE
for COVID-19 and τ = τE for Spanish flu), assuming independence between the time an individual
is infectious and their activity, we compute
R0 =
1
n
∑
i∈V
(ai + 〈a〉)mλτ = 2〈a〉mλτ , (23)
which implies
λ =
R0
2m〈a〉τ . (24)
The epidemic parameters computed using this procedure are the following.
• Gonorrhoea. We find λ = 0.3626 and µ = 0.1195, where the time unit is a week.
• Spanish Flu. We obtain λ = 0.066, µ = 0.2164 and ν = 0.4092, where the time unit is a
day.
• COVID-19. We compute λ = 0.03, µ = 0.1813 and ν = 0.1813, where the time unit is a
day.
Decision-making parameters of the simulations We set a common level of rationality β = 6 in
all simulations, which captures a moderate level of rationality so that individuals tend to maximise
their payoff, but always have a small, non-negligible probability of adopting the behaviour with
the lower payoff. Before detailing the parameters used in the three case studies, we provide a brief
discussion on the relative order of magnitude between the model parameters, which guided our
choices.
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The decision-making process is based on the comparison between the two payoff functions in
Eqs. (2a) and (2b). The contribution of social influence to the payoff is always bounded between
0 and 1. Hence, social influence is significant if the other terms do not have a higher order of
magnitude. Consequently, policy interventions u(t) > 1 can be considered severe, since their
effect is predominant with respect to social influence, while policies with u(t) < 1 are milder. The
cost of self-protective behaviours consists of two terms: the immediate cost per unit-time c and
the accumulation factor γ. Small values of c become negligible in the decision making process,
while, to avoid the immediate cost dominating the other terms, we should assume c < 1. The
accumulation factor γ captures the cost for continued periods in which an individual adopts self-
protective behaviours. To model a non-negligible effect of the accumulation of socio-economic
costs, we should guarantee that over long periods in which an individual consistently adopts self-
protective behaviours, the frustration function saturates to a value comparable to the other terms.
This can be achieved by imposing that
lim
t→∞
c+
t∑
s=1
γsc =
c
1− γ ≈ 1, (25)
yielding c+γ ≈ 1 (note, the above equality was obtained using the geometric series). Specifically,
values of γ > 1 − c guarantees that self-protective behaviours are eventually dismissed, after
the complete eradication of the disease or the policy intervention is switched off. We use the risk
perception function r(t) = kzα proposed in Eq. (12) with α = 1/2 for cautious populations, α = 1
to model proportional reactions, and α = 2 for slow reacting populations. As observed in Eq. (13),
the risk perception function determines a critical epidemic prevalence that triggers the adoption of
self-protective behaviours even in the absence of interventions (in the presence of accumulation,
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the immediate cost c in Eq. (13) is substituted by its saturation value from Eq. (25) c/(1 − γ)).
We observe from Eq. (13) that risk perception becomes non-negligible if k > 1 + c
1−γ . To keep
consistency throughout our simulations, we set k = 3, which is a value that verifies the condition
above for all the choices of parameters c and γ we make in the simulations.
The decision-making parameters used for the three case studies are detailed in the following.
• Gonorrhoea. We assume that the accumulation is negligible for gonorrhoea (where the use
of protections has an immediate cost that typically does not accumulate, such as protective
sexual barriers). Hence, for all three simulations, we fix the immediate cost to c = 0.3 and
the accumulation factor γ = 0. No policy intervention is set, with u(t) = 0 for all t ≥ 0.
In the three simulations, we test three different risk perception function. Specifically, we
consider a cautious population with r(z) = 3
√
z in Fig. 3a, a population with a proportional
reaction, r(z) = 3z in Fig. 3b, and a population slow to react with r(z) = 3z2 in Fig. 3c.
• Spanish flu. Self-protective behaviours involve social distancing and closures of economic
activities, which has been shown to typically yield an accumulation of psychological distress
and economic losses18–20. Hence, we assume a high accumulation factor γ = 0.9 and we fix
c = 0.1, in light of our discussion above. To capture the slow reaction of the population
due to the initial suppression of information (to keep morale during World War I)6, 42, we
set r(z) = 3z2. To further mirror real-world interventions by public authorities, we set an
initial intervention level equal to u(0) = 0, which switches to u(t) = u¯ = 0.5 once 1% of
the population is infected and then remains active for 28 days before being turned off again.
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• COVID-19. Similar as we did for the Spanish flu, we assume that accumulation is non-
negligible by setting γ = 0.75. Note that we select a smaller value of γ than the one used for
Spanish flu to capture how development in information and communications technologies
has helped alleviate the negative impact of extended lockdown policies during COVID-19
outbreak. In view of the observations above, we fix c = 0.3. We consider a scenario in
which individuals are slow to perceive COVID-19 as a real threat (r(z) = 3z2), as happened
in many countries including the UK and US43. In Fig. 5a, we start with u(0) = 0, and
then set the intervention as u(t) = 0.7 when 1% of the population is infected, which is then
turned off if 14 consecutive days pass with z(t) = 0. In Fig. 5b and Fig. 5c, we consider
scenarios involving an initial severe but constant lockdown policy followed by a phased
reduction. In the first scenario (Fig. 5b), severe policies (u(t) = 1.1) are implemented for
28 days after reaching 1% of infections, after which u(t) is linearly reduced to u(t) = 0
over 35 time-steps. In the second scenario (Fig. 5c), more severe policies (u(t) = 1.25) are
implemented for the same period of 28 time-steps, after which u(t) is linearly reduced to
u(t) = 0 over a shorter time-window of 24 time-steps. Note that we select the intensity of
policy interventions and the duration of the phased reduction to ensure that the cumulative
intervention effort,
∑
t u(t), over the policy intervention period, is equal in the two scenarios.
Finally, in Fig. 5d, we tested the intervention scenario in Fig. 5b but in the absence of social
influence. Specifically, we removed the first term in each the two payoff functions in Eqs.
(2a) and (2b).
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Data Availability All data generated or analysed during this study are included in this Article
(and its Supplementary Information files).
Code Availability The code used in the simulations is available at https://github.com/lzino90/behavior.
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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Modelling epidemic dynamics under collective
decision making
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FIG. S1: Extension of the Spanish Flu (SEIR) case study in the main article. Prevalence of Spanish flu
infections (red curve) and cumulative infections (orange curve) as a function of time as predicted by an SEIR model
in combination with the co-evolution paradigm. The colour intensity of the blue vertical bands represents the
fraction of adopters of self-protective behaviours. Consistent with the main article, we set γ = 0.9 and c = 0.1, and
an initial intervention level equal to u(0) = 0, which switches to u(t) = u¯ = 0.5 once 1% of the population is infected
and then remains active for T¯ days before being turned off again. In Fig. S1a, we set r(z) = 3z2 (consistent with
Fig. 4 in the main article), but double the intervention duration to T¯ = 56 days. In Fig. S1b, we retain the original
T¯ = 28 days from Fig. 4 in the main article, but assume a more cautious population that is better informed, with
r(z) = 3
√
z. In both figures, we see the epidemic outbreak is successfully halted after a single wave, either by a
longer policy intervention or a population that has a heightened risk perception, in contrast to Fig. 4 of the main
article. The impact of the outbreak is measured by health cost (a) H = 10.69% and (b) H = 3.52%, and
socio-economic cost (a) C = 2.7 and (b) C = 2.5, as detailed in the Methods.
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
Time (days)
S
el
f-
p
ro
te
ct
io
n
s
a
d
o
p
ti
o
n
ra
te
〈y(t)〉
u(t)
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
P
o
li
cy
in
te
rv
en
ti
o
n
s,
u
(t
)
(a)
FIG. S2: Lag in the Adoption of Self-Protective Behaviours. This figure shows the same simulation as that
in Fig. 5a of the main article. The adoption rate (blue solid curve) of self-protective behaviours, is quantified by
〈y(t)〉 = 1n
∑n
i=1 yi(t), and the intervention policy (cyan dashed curve) shows an on/off constant policy intervention
u(t) = u¯ = 0.7 being switched on when z(t) > 0.01, and switched off after no infections are reported for 14
consecutive days. Notice that although the intervention is introduced at t = 19, adoption of the self-protective
behaviours peaks only 20 days later, at t = 39 with 73% adoption rate among the populationa. This allows us to
conclude that the adoption of self-protective behaviours is delayed by social influence, which has an inertia effect,
and the adoption rate improves because of individuals have an increasing perceived risk of infection as the epidemic
grows. In contrast, all individuals revert back to standard behaviours at t = 215 days, almost immediately after the
intervention policy ends at t = 214.
a This adoption rate is well below the 99% seen in Fig. 5b and 5c of the main article, highlighting the necessity of severe interventions
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FIG. S3: The Role of Social Influence. Fig. S3a and Fig. S3b show the same simulation as that corresponding to
Fig. 5b and 5d in the main article, respectively. The adoption rate (blue solid curve) of self-protective behaviours, is
quantified by 〈y(t)〉 = 1n
∑n
i=1 yi(t), and the intervention policy (cyan dashed curve) shows an initial severe and
constant lockdown for 28 days after z(t) > 0.01, followed by a linear phased reduction over 35 days. Note that for
the sake of clarity, the disease evolution is not shown here, and we only plot the time horizon up to the first policy
intervention for Fig. 5d (in actuality, multiple interventions are necessary due to resurgent infection waves). Notice
that in Fig. S3a, there is a delay of 3-4 days between the start of the intervention, and all individuals adopting
self-protective behaviours, in contrast to Fig. S3b, where there is only a single day of delay. This supports the claim
that social influence has an inertia effect in the beginning, but this delay is shortened by a severe intervention.
During the 28 days of constant intervention, social influence acts to ensure a collective adoption of self-protective
behaviours, countering the effects of accumulating costs fi(t), with 〈y(t)〉 ≈ 0.99 in Fig. S3a. In contrast, Fig. S3b
sees an initial collective adoption driven by u(t), but as costs accumulate, adoption drops to a constant of
〈y(t)〉 ≈ 0.65. However, once the phased reduction begins, we see the population with no social influence in Fig. S3b
closely mirror the phased reduction. In contrast, social influence in Fig. S3a leads to a collective rejection of
self-protective behaviours, with 〈y(t)〉 ≈ 0 by t = 68, over two weeks before the end of the phased reduction at
t = 84 days.
